The State of Utah v. Edward H. James : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
The State of Utah v. Edward H. James : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Elizabeth A. Bowman; Elizabeth Holbrook; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. James, No. 920264 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4198
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
POCKET N K> °mnA IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EDWARD H. JAMES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920264-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Attempted 
Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
sections 76-4-101 and 76-6-202, in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. 
Rokich, Judge, presiding. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAR 1 9 1993 
9tU/f(pc 
J. Mary T. Noonan 
Y Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ITATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ID H. JAMES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920264-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Attempted 
Bur lary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
sec Lons 76-4-101 and 76-6-202, in the Third Judicial District Court 
in id for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A. 
Rok :h, Judge, presiding. 
Sal 
3RAHAM 
RNEY GENERAL 
liENE BARLOW 
5TANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
State Capitol Building 
Lake City, Utah 84114 
rneys for Appellee 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES XX 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT 2 
II. FEDERAL LAW CALLS FOR SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF 
MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS 5 
III. MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED 
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 9 
CONCLUSION 13 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 469 U.S. 420 (1984) 11 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) passim 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) 3, 7-9, 11 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) 6 
Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) . 11 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) 7-8, 13 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989) 6-8, 12 
State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943) 12 
State v. Mirguet, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 
1993) 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Art. I, § 12, Utah Const. (1991 Repl. Vol.) 11-12 
Amend. V, U.S. Const 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
EDWARD H. JAMES, : Case No. 920264-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appendix 1 to this brief contains the full text of: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 (1991 Repl. Vol.) 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (1991 Repl. Vol.) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1992) 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV section 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court should not have signed the findings and 
conclusions drafted by the prosecutor because the findings 
contradicted the trial court's factual assessment of the case and 
the evidence. 
The record in this case demonstrates not only a Miranda 
violation, but also coercive police conduct within the meaning of 
the fifth amendment. As the detective's incredible explanation for 
why the detectives began the interrogation without a Miranda warning 
demonstrates (because they needed to clarify Edward James7 unusual 
names and birthdate), the detectives knew or should have known that 
their express questioning of Mr. James would lead to an 
incriminating response from him, and were seeking to evade the 
Miranda requirements by initiating the interrogation with seemingly 
innocuous questions (such as asking his address, which was 
apparently next door to the burglary that the detectives had already 
announced they were investigating). In interrogating Mr. James 
while he was in custody, with two detectives, without the benefit of 
Miranda, without recording the encounter, and in isolated 
circumstances, the police conducted themselves in a coercive manner, 
entitling Mr. James to suppression of all of his statements to the 
police. 
Because the police violated Mr. James7 federal 
constitutional rights and he is entitled to suppression under 
federal law, this Court need not reach the state constitutional 
issues in this case. However, because federal law governing 
confessions is wanting and confusing, this Court should depart from 
federal standards in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
In its summary of Point I of Appellee's brief, the State 
argues, 
The trial court's adoption of the findings 
and conclusions submitted by the prosecution was 
not "merely mechanical." The court had given the 
decision much thought and had the benefit of 
defendant's filed objections to the findings and 
conclusions. The record demonstrates that the 
court adequately deliberated and considered the 
merits of the case before adopting the proposed 
findings and conclusions. Neither were the 
findings contrary to any "oral finding" because 
-2 -
the court entered few, if any, findings orally. 
Finally the record supports the findings so they 
were not in conflict with the evidence. 
Brief of Appellee at 7. 
If this Court will examine the record, this Court will see 
that Judge Rokich initially ruled that the police were not 
performing any administrative identification procedures when they 
began to interrogate Mr. James, and should have given Mr. James a 
Miranda warning before the interrogation (T. 20-24). At the next 
hearing, Judge Rokich indicated that the detectives should have 
given Mr. James the Miranda warnings, but that his post-confession 
and post-Miranda statements were voluntary and admissible under 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (T.2 1-2). The findings and 
conclusions, however, indicate that the police owed Mr. James no 
Miranda warnings because they were not interrogating him in asking 
him identifying administrative guestions, and that if there was a 
Miranda violation, the post-Miranda statements of Mr. James were 
nonetheless voluntary and admissible (R. 85-87). Because the 
findings and conclusions conflicted with the views expressed in the 
trial court's original findings and later ruling, the trial court 
should not have adopted them. Additional legal authority for Mr. 
James' contention to this effect is found in State v. Mirquet, 203 
Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1993), where this Court recognized that 
counsel-drafted findings and conclusions are not as instructive as a 
court-drafted memorandum decision in appellate understanding of a 
trial court's reasoning. Id. at 35 n.4. Viewing the entire record 
in this case, this Court can see that it was in fact that trial 
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court's rationale that the detectives were not seeking to verify Mr. 
James' identity when they began the interrogation without informing 
Mr. James of his rights, in violation of Miranda. 
The portions of the findings and conclusions justifying the 
pre-Miranda statements as assisting the police to determine Mr. 
James' identity are also legally insufficient because they are in 
conflict with the evidence. The State concedes that the detectives 
intended to interrogate Mr. James, but argues that the initial 
questions were, as indicated in the prosecution-drafted findings and 
conclusions, designed to help the detectives ascertain that they 
were really interrogating the right person. The State makes this 
argument on the basis of inference, rather than on the basis of a 
record citation. Brief of Appellee at 17. As the preliminary 
hearing transcript which was presented to the trial court 
demonstrates, the detectives were not seeking to determine whether 
they were interviewing Edward James or not. Detective Newren 
testified that prior to the Miranda warnings the detectives informed 
Mr. James that they were investigating a burglary (at a certain 
address apparently next door to Mr. James7 residence) and asked Mr. 
James some "identification" questions (R. 70). He then indicated 
that the questions were "[c]larifying his name and different things 
like that, because of the unusualness of the Edward and the James 
and the date of birth." (R. 72). In sum, the trial court was 
correct in initially finding that the detectives were seeking a 
confession in interrogating Mr. James, rather than seeking to 
ascertain his identity, and the findings and conclusions to the 
-4 -
contrary are legally insufficient. 
II. 
FEDERAL LAW CALLS FOR SUPPRESSION 
OF ALL OF MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS. 
The summary of the State's argument in Point II of the 
Appellee's brief indicates, 
The court correctly denied the suppression 
motion under the federal constitution because the 
biographical data questions asked of defendant 
were not "interrogation" in the Miranda sense. 
Defendant's volunteered statement that he had 
committed the burglary and theft did not come in 
response to a question which the officers 
reasonably should have known would have elicited 
an incriminating response. Even if the 
volunteered statement should have been 
suppressed, the statements obtained after Miranda 
warnings were given were admissible under federal 
law. Finally, defendant's claim that the 
officers did not record the statements is not 
factually correct; they were recorded in the 
officer's reports. 
Brief of Appellee at 7-8. 
The first problem with the State's position is that the 
detectives were not seeking biographical data. As the trial court 
initially found, the detectives had Mr. James' biographical data on 
his booking sheet (T. 20-24). The State argues that the question 
preceding Mr. James' admission, concerning Mr. James' employment, 
was not interrogation because the detectives had no reasonable way 
of knowing that the question was likely to lead to an incriminating 
response. Brief of Appellee at 26. The State's argument focuses 
unduly on the one question, to the exclusion of the overall facts 
which should have informed the detectives that their conduct was 
likely to lead to an incriminating response. Detective Newren's 
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testimony that they informed Mr. James that they were investigating 
the burglary at the apartment which is apparently next door to Mr. 
James', and then began asking him questions including his address 
before the Miranda warnings because of Edward James7 unusual names 
and date of birth demonstrates that the detectives were not really 
seeking biographical data, but were trying to evade the Miranda 
requirements in interrogating Mr. James with apparently innocuous 
questions. This Court should not tolerate the detectives' tactics. 
See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 610 (1990)(Marshall, J., 
concurring and dissenting)(citing cases recognizing that apparently 
innocuous questions constitute interrogation if circumstances of 
case demonstrate that questions and circumstances are reasonably 
likely to lead to an incriminating response). 
The State's argument that the police made an adequate 
recording of their encounter with Mr. James by memorializing the 
events in their police reports fails to appreciate the supreme 
court's directives in State v. Carter, 776 P,2d 886, 891 (Utah 
1989), to provide accurate records of custodial interrogations. The 
method used here (simple recording in police reports) is less 
accurate than the method criticized in Carter, where at least the 
defendant was given the opportunity to verify the officers' versions 
of events. More importantly here, unlike in Carter, there are 
identifiable inconsistencies concerning what occurred during the 
encounter with the police. For instance, did Mr. James make his 
admission in response to a question about his employment (R. 73), or 
in response to a question about the burglary (R. 70)? For instance, 
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if the detectives were merely seeking to clarify Mr. James unusual 
names and birthdate before giving him the Miranda warning and 
proceeding with the interrogation (R. 72), why did they ask him 
about his address and employment? Given the subtle nuances that 
must be considered when courts are evaluating whether seemingly 
innocuous questions are in fact interrogation, the questions must be 
recorded accurately. The detectives' failure to record the 
encounter with Mr. James constituted a violation of the law set 
forth years ago in Carter. 
While the State argues that Mr. James post-Miranda 
statements were admissible under Elstady the State admits two 
indicators of coercion: the fact that the interrogation occurred 
while Mr. James was in custody — an "inherently coercive" 
atmosphere, and the fact that there were two officers interrogating 
Mr. James. Brief of Appellee at 18, 29. These concessions should 
be remembered in light of the State's "heavy" burden to demonstrate 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
The State argues that there was no evidence that the 
interview took place in an isolated location, or that Mr. James had 
no family, friends, or attorney present. Brief of Appellee at 29. 
Given that it was the State's burden to demonstrate the 
voluntariness of the confession, it was the State's burden to 
demonstrate if Mr. James' family, friends or attorney was present. 
E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988). More 
importantly, the record amply demonstrates that during the 
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interrogation, there was no one present but Mr. James and the two 
detectives, E>q. R. 69 ("Q: Uh, and who was present during the 
course of the interview?" "A: Another police officer by the name of 
Steve Chever, myself, and Mr. James."). 
The State chooses to focus on indicia of voluntariness 
discussed in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). Brief of 
Appellee at 27-30. The State's limited inquiry into voluntariness 
considerations does not diminish the case law discussed at pages 33 
through 35 of Mr. James7 opening brief which demonstrates the 
coerciveness of the interrogation, which involved two detectives who 
interrogated the nineteen-year-old Mr. James in and isolated and 
custodial setting in violation of Carter's mandate to make a 
reliable recording of custodial interrogations, and who did not 
inform Mr. James of his Miranda rights in a timely fashion or until 
they had already received his confession. See e.g. Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 475-476 (government bears heavy burden to demonstrate 
knowing and voluntary waiver; "any evidence that the accused was 
threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show 
that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege."). 
Compare the facts of this case with those in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298, 301-302, 314-316 (1985)(statements taken in apparent 
violation of Miranda were not coerced, where statements were made 
before defendant was arrested, when defendant was in his home at day 
time with his mother nearby, when police were not intending to 
interrogate the defendant but were seeking to inform his mother 
about why he was being arrested, and the defendant's statements were 
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recorded and he was given the opportunity to modify a typewritten 
transcript of his statements). 
Because the statements initially taken from Mr. James in 
the jail before the Miranda warnings were actually coerced, it was 
the State's burden to demonstrate that intervening events allowed 
Mr. James to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda 
rights and voluntary post-Miranda admissions. See Elstad at 310 
("When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes 
between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the 
change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that 
coercion has carried over into the second confession."). The State 
has failed to carry this burden, and Mr. James is therefore entitled 
to suppression of both his pre- and post-Miranda admissions. 
III. 
MR. JAMES STATEMENTS 
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Because Mr. James7 statements should have been suppressed 
under the federal constitution, and because the state constitution 
must provide at least as much protection as is provided by the 
federal constitution, it appears that the Utah Constitution would 
call for the suppression of Mr. James7 statements on the basis of 
the analysis of points I and II of this brief. While it may be 
unnecessary for this Court to address the state constitutional 
issues in this case, this Court may choose to articulate clear state 
law, where the federal law provides insufficient guidance for the 
police. 
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In challenging Mr. James' state constitutional arguments, 
the State argues in its summary, as follows: 
Defendant has waived the issue of a separate 
state constitutional analysis of his claims 
because he failed to preserve them. The motion 
below failed to provide "thoughtful and probing 
analysis" of the state claim. Alternatively, the 
different Miranda-type requirements sought to be 
established by defendant would only cause 
confusion and unworkable direction to police 
officers. Since there is no current 
contradictory and confusing law under the federal 
standard, there is no need to adopt a separate 
state standard. A separate requirement for audio 
or videotaping of the statements before they are 
admissible is a change which "should be made only 
after a full hearing of all the policy and 
financial implications and with adequate advance 
notice to . . . law enforcement." Finally, 
federal law regarding admission of statements 
obtained after warning which followed previous 
unwarned but uncoerced statements is consistent 
with current state law and no reason was given 
for rejecting the federal case law. 
Brief of Appellee at 8. 
The memorandum submitted to the trial court explained 
several Utah cases demonstrating Utah's interpretation of the Utah 
Constitution independently from federal law, to insure that Utah law 
is clear and leads to reliable results. The memorandum referred to 
the unique history of this state, which supports the federalist 
principle at work in independent state constitutional analysis. The 
memorandum reviewed differing federal and Utah standards for when 
Miranda warnings must be given (under federal law, warnings are owed 
when there is custodial interrogation, whereas under Utah law, 
warnings are owed when the the investigation focuses on suspect or 
becomes accusatorial). The memorandum reviewed the accusatorial 
facts and circumstances of Mr. James' case, wherein two detectives 
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investigating a particular burglary sought a confession from Mr. 
James in the jail when Mr. James had been arrested for the 
burglary. Trial counsel argued that under Salt Lake City v. earner, 
664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), an Article I section 12 case, Mr. James 
was entitled to Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview (R. 
96). At the hearing on the separate state constitutional motion to 
suppress, trial counsel argued that Oregon v. Elstad should not 
apply in this case, because the officers intentionally violated Mr. 
James' Miranda rights (T. 28-29). Trial counsel asked the trial 
court to suppress all statements taken in violation of Mr. James' 
rights under Utah law. See R. 94-96, 100-101. The trial court 
ruled under the Utah Constitution that the interview of the burglary 
suspect by the burglary detectives in the jail was not in an 
accusatorial environment (R. 108). 
The State's argument that there is no need for a state 
standard because federal law is adequate and consistent fails to 
appreciate how easily the police can avoid the Miranda warnings 
requirement by simply delaying taking the suspect into physical 
custody until the interrogation is successful. See Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 469 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). Under the law explained in the 
Article I section 12 case, Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1983), the police have the obligation to give the warnings 
when the interrogation becomes custodial or accusatory, and are thus 
given far less discretion to manipulate the warnings. 
The State's argument that federal law is adequate and 
consistent also fails to appreciate how the Elstad decision allows 
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the police to eviscerate Miranda by allowing them to obtain 
confessions through Miranda violations and then to perfunctorily 
comply with Miranda and obtain redundant confessions as though the 
confessions obtained through the Miranda violations had no bearing 
on the voluntariness of the post-Miranda confessions. Article I 
section 12 law has traditionally taken a more police-restrictive 
approach, requiring the state to demonstrate that confessions 
following police illegalities are given in circumstances where "the 
effect of the primary improper inducement was so entirely 
obliterated from his mind that the subsequent confession could not 
have been in the slightest degree influenced by it; and if there be 
any doubt on this question, it must be resolved in favor of the 
prisoner, and the confession must be excluded." State v. Crank, 142 
P.2d 178, 184 and 192 (Utah 1943)(citation omitted). 
The State implies that a recording requirement for police 
interrogations should not be imposed without study of the impact 
that the requirement would pose or without advance notice of the 
requirement. Brief of Appellee at 43. The argument overlooks the 
fact that the Utah Supreme Court has already informed the police 
that the integrity of criminal cases may very well hinge on the 
accuracy of the recording of purported confessions. State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989). Where Nevada appears satisfied 
with a jury's resolution of the reliability of police testimony 
concerning the events of interrogation, brief of Appellee at 42, 
Utah courts have repeatedly recognized an independent judicial duty 
to insure the protection of fundamental rights such as those at 
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issue in this case. E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 
(Utah 1988) ("'[I]t is the duty of an appellate court . . . 'to 
examine the entire record and make and independent determination of 
the ultimate issue of voluntariness.'")(citations omitted). Given 
the inexpensiveness and ready availability of recording devices, it 
would seem to the benefit of the State to require the police to 
record interrogations. Unless there is police misconduct to hide, 
it would seem that a reliable recording of police interrogations 
would greatly simplify the State's burdens to demonstrate that 
confessions were made in legal circumstances. See e.g. Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444-445 (describing state's burdens prior to the admission 
of statements made during custodial interrogation). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's rulings denying 
Mr. James' motions to suppress the statements taken in violation of 
his fundamental rights. 
Respectfully submitted this J_ day of 
1993. 
EJ^i^BETHA. BOWMAfr 
/^ttgxn&y for Mr. Ja: mes 
Attorney for Mr. James 
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APPENDIX 1 
Text of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is cilleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband 
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant 
to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds 
of its action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, 
shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court 
need not enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in rulings on motions, except as provided 
in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a 
brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion 
is based on more than one ground. 
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
